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Using data from the Stop-and-Frisk programme of the New York Police Department (NYPD), we
evaluate the impact of a specific terrorist attack threat from Al Qaeda on policing behaviour in New York
City. We find that after the Department of Homeland Security raised the alert level in response to this
threat, people categorized as ‘Other’ by the NYPD, including Arabs, were significantly more likely to be
frisked and have force used against them, yet were not more likely to be arrested. These individuals were in
turn less likely to be frisked or have force used against them immediately after the alert level returned to its
baseline level. Further, evidence suggests that these impacts were larger in magnitude in police precincts
that have higher concentrations of mosques. Our results are consistent with profiling by police officers
leading to low-productivity stops, but we cannot rule out that it constitutes efficient policing given
important differences between deterrence of terrorism versus other crimes.
INTRODUCTION
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (known as 9/11), law
enforcement’s focus has evolved to also include domestic terrorist threats. A large
number of plots have been foiled, including two attempts to bomb the New York City
(NYC) Subway and a car bombing attempt in Times Square on 1 May 2010.1 Yet survey
research shows that while most people are generally satisfied with the way in which the
police perform their duties, beliefs have grown that individual police officers treat
suspects of different races or ethnicities differently.2 These potential racial differences
have attracted substantial controversy, and in response many police departments
introduced policies to deter racial profiling in order to reduce these beliefs and restore
public support.
Being a police officer can be challenging, particularly when faced with the additional
challenges posed by terrorism. Police officers occasionally have to make life-and-death
split-second decisions that may leave room for unconscious racial bias to arise, regardless
of training or department policies and procedures. Evidence of unconscious racial bias
among police officers is summarized by Fridell (2008, 2016), who notes that while certain
interventions can reduce associations between race or ethnicity and crime, they do not
fully eliminate them.
More generally, theories of statistical discrimination often posit that racial differences
in policing arise at least partly due to the effect of perceptions of identity.3 A key
implication from such models is that differentials in outcomes by race or ethnicity may be
quite responsive to changes in perceptions. To empirically test this prediction requires a
salient and exogenous event that could plausibly alter an individual police officer’s racial
perceptions of a group. In this paper, we argue that an announcement made by the
Department of Homeland Security on 1 August 2004 provided such salient information
to law enforcement officials. The announcement warned of an immediate terrorist threat
to financial institutions in New York, Washington, DC, and New Jersey, and was
accompanied by a change in the colour-coded Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS) scale. The HSAS was designed to warn citizens and lead to additional security
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measures taken by various government institutions, generally including both federal
agencies and law enforcement.
We use detailed data from the Stop-and-Frisk programme of NYC to examine
whether this increase in the alert level from yellow (elevated risk) to orange (high risk)
had an impact on police officer behaviour based on the race or ethnicity of alleged
perpetrators. We conjecture that racial minorities from the Middle East and North
Africa may have received additional scrutiny given the association between Al Qaeda and
those regions.4 This conjecture is motivated by the intuitive notion that terrorism is an
area where individuals may be particularly prone to making assumptions regarding the
ethnicity of perpetrators.5 Similarly, any unconscious biases held by individual police
officers may likely emerge in situations where threats and stakes are higher; and these
situations may lessen the criteria of reasonable suspicion needed to stop and frisk
individuals irrespective of their race or ethnicity.
Our empirical tests not only examine if the rate of stops leading to an arrest differed
after the HSAS announcement,6 but also explore if it altered police officer behaviour in
terms of the number of stops as well as whether they frisked the suspects or used force as
part of these stops. Complementary to Draca et al. (2011), who study how the July 2005
London terror attacks influenced police deployment and reported crime levels across
districts, we focus on differential individual officer responses by suspect race or ethnicity.
We motivate our empirical test with a model that extends the hit rates test from Knowles
et al. (2001) to consider the addition of terrorism-related duties, how terrorist threats
may affect perceptions of officers, and the possibility that deterring a terrorist attack
offers larger benefits to a police officer than other crimes.
Our analysis uncovers that the 1 August 2004 increase in the alert level led to a
substantial and statistically significant 13% increase in the probability of being frisked
for people characterized as ‘Other’, including Arabs. This constitutes a 6% additional
increase in frisking compared to other racial groups, and we also find evidence of a
disproportionate 9% increase in the use of force, yet no higher odds of them being
arrested or stopped. Further evidence suggests that these increases in frisking were
particularly large during rush-hour times and in areas with higher concentrations of
mosques. When the threat subsided, the relative probability of being frisked or have force
used against them in turn decreased for this group. A natural question is whether it is
possible to distinguish between statistical and taste- or bias-based discrimination in this
setting. Although the additional frisks of Arabs led to no additional arrests, which points
towards an irrational explanation, caution is warranted when interpreting our results.
The results are consistent with the idea that making threats salient can bring out
potentially latent discrimination, which appears inefficient in our application since there
was no increase in arrests. Still, given important differences between terrorism and other
crimes as well as the larger stakes at play, we cannot rule out that these changes in
behaviour constitute efficient policing.
This paper has a natural link to two contentious literatures on law enforcement
related to racial bias in the Stop-and-Frisk programme and the effects of Homeland
Security terror alerts. On the latter, Shapiro and Cohen (2007) note that the HSAS was
not viewed in a good light by citizens, who claimed that it was vague and uninformative
regarding details of potential threats.7 Changes in alert levels have been examined by
Klick and Tabarrok (2005), who find that crime decreased in Washington, DC, during
high-alert periods prior to July 2003 due to increased police presence, and by Omer et al.
(2007), who find that changes in alert levels did not increase stress levels as proxied by
calls to a law-enforcement peer-support hotline. On the former, despite front page
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headlines and criticism in the popular press,8 Coviello and Persico (2015) do not find
evidence of racial discrimination in the Stop-and-Frisk programme of the New York
Police Department (NYPD) when using the hit rates test, but along with Goel et al.
(2016), present evidence supportive of discrimination against African-Americans when
restricting attention to stops relating to the possession of a concealed weapon. Lehrer
and Lepage (2019) also use the hit rates test and additionally account for the fact that the
category of stop reported reflects a behavioural choice of police officers. They report
evidence of discrimination for crimes related to weapons and drugs. While this paper
does not answer questions of how police officers should be monitored,9 it provides
relevant evidence on how their behaviour adapts to exogenous changes in information on
criminality by racial or ethnic group.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide an
overview of the data and research design employed to identify changes in policing. Our
empirical results are presented in Section II, along with robustness checks and a
discussion on interpreting our results. Finally, Section III summarizes our main findings
and concludes.
I. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND TEST
In this section, we first describe the event that provides an exogenous information shock
to police officer perceptions. We then describe the dataset utilized, and provide an outline
of the empirical strategy.
The terror alert of August 2004
The HSAS for terrorism was activated on 12 March 2002, and the threat level was raised
six times from ‘yellow’ to ‘orange’, corresponding to a move from elevated to high
threat.10 The HSAS increase that took place on 1 August 2004 was accompanied by a
specific warning that identified financial institutions in New York, Washington, DC, and
New Jersey as being targeted by Al Qaeda.11 This was the only increase of the six total
alert increases that was specific about the potential targets and also explained the sources
and quality of the intelligence on which the threat was based.12 The increase from yellow
to orange is also particularly important in our context since orange is the first level to
explicitly require the coordination of security efforts with local law enforcement agencies,
including the NYPD. Further, Morris (2003) reports that the NYPD commissioner
mentioned that an orange alert level generally meant an ‘orange plus’ level for the city,
which led to additional security measures such as increased security at public events and
important locations, additional police presence in mass transit systems, and additional
checkpoints at bridges, tunnels and other locations.
Since the alert had a marked emphasis on NYC, it may have been particularly salient
to NYPD officers. It was also particularly long in that the orange status was maintained
for nearly 100 days. The New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly publicly stated
that that the NYPD would respond by providing ‘significant security’ at selected
buildings and would step up both random and targeted searches of vehicles entering the
city. Since the information concerning the threat suggested an attack by car or truck
bomb, several streets near financial centres in midtown Manhattan were initially closed,
and trucks were banned from entering bridges and tunnels leading to Wall Street.
The head of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, mentioned being
very confident in the information, some of which had been seized from an Al Qaeda
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operative as part of a CIA–Pakistani operation in Pakistan not long before and included
detailed planning information as well as sketches of potential targets, including the Stock
Exchange and Citigroup Center in New York. Further, information was found that
suggested scouting by potential terrorists had recently been done to identify security in
and around specific buildings, and midweek pedestrian traffic counts of the number of
people per minute on each side of the street, identifying the best places for further
reconnaissance, tips on how to make contact with employees who work in the buildings,
general traffic patterns, and locations of hospitals and police departments.13 The alert
level was lowered to yellow on 10 November 2004 once permanent protective measures
were put in place around specific locations throughout the financial services sector.
Even with these additional measures taken by the NYPD, it appears unlikely that
increased targeting of Arabs during the period would be the product of a (likely illegal)
top-down policy representing a conscious, concerted effort by the NYPD. While officers
were certainly encouraged to be vigilant and may have been directed to increase stops
and searching of suspicious individuals, we found no evidence of any explicit targeting,
and NYC police commissioner Raymond Kelly has referred to racial profiling as a
counter-terrorism measure as being ‘just nuts’.14
Data
Our primary data are gathered from NYC Open Data and comprise all recorded stops
from the Stop-and-Frisk programme between 2003 and 2012, which we restrict to stops
from 2003 to the end of the HSAS in April 2011. For every stop, we are provided with
detailed personal characteristics of the suspect, including age, gender, ethnicity, height,
weight, hair and eye colour, plus the date and location of the stop as well as detailed
information about the type of crime, weapons found and whether force was used.15 In
addition, we are provided with the officer’s self-reported basis of search and reason for
frisk as well as whether an arrest was made or summons issued to the suspect. The race/
ethnicity categories used by the NYPD for the suspects are White, Black, White
Hispanic, Black Hispanic, Asian, Unrecognized, American-Indian and Other.16 The
race/ethnicity category, along with other stop information, is reported by the police
officer who performed the stop. We focus on ‘Other’ as the group of interest in our
application, and pool Whites, Asians and Hispanics as the reference group. While it is
not possible to specifically identify which racial groups enter in ‘Other’ or in what
proportion, these are unlikely to change due to alert increases. Further, considering the
different categories, it seems unlikely that estimated impacts of alert changes would be
driven by racial subgroups other than Arabs and people from North Africa and the
Middle East potentially contained in the ‘Other’ category. According to the 2010 Census,
the New York Metro Area had the second largest Arab-American population in the
USA, with 371,233 residents, an estimated 1.68% of the population, which could account
for up to 40% of the group ‘Other’. Following Coviello and Persico (2015) and other
papers using the Stop-and-Frisk data, we consider these data representative of all stops
even though police officers are not required to report those that do not involve the use of
force or lead to a frisk, search, arrest or summons.17 Our final sample restricted to the
treatment and comparison groups of interest consists of 1,792,781 unique stops.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the average number of daily stops and
outcomes of interest. The average number of stops per day was 595 over the 3012 days
studied in our sample, of which about 9.4% involved members of the racial group
‘Other’. Throughout our analysis, we rescale the binary outcome variables to 100 or 0,
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therefore allowing coefficient estimates to be interpreted as direct percentage point
effects. About half of the stops in the sample (48.42%) involved frisking for all racial
groups combined, while the mean for suspects of the racial group ‘Other’ was slightly
lower, at approximately 45.1%. The likelihood of an arrest is on average 5.82% overall
and 4.2% for Others. Finally, unconditionally there is little difference in the likelihood of
force being used by the NYPD between the two groups, the daily mean being around
23% for both.
Effect on racial profiling by police
In the Appendix, we provide a stylized model outlining how exogenous changes in terror
alert levels could influence a variety of policing behaviours. It differs from the original hit
rates model of Knowles et al. (2001) by allowing the behaviour of terrorists to differ from
that of other criminals, mainly by considering the case where they may not be deterred by
the threat of apprehension. The model generates clear testable predictions on how police





Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcomes
Frisk 48.43 (49.98) 45.13 (49.76)
Arrest 5.82 (23.41) 4.20 (20.06)
Force 23.41 (42.34) 23.45 (42.37)
Daily number of stops 595.21 (252.31) 54.55 (29.61)
Demographics
Male 92.43 (26.45) 90.90 (28.76)
Age 28.08 (11.90) 28.48 (12.92)
Youth 54.06 (49.84) 53.98 (49.84)
Time
Night 59.34 (49.12) 60.79 (48.82)
Friday–Sunday 43.22 (49.54) 45.60 (49.81)
Winter 27.32 (44.56) 27.17 (44.48)
Spring 28.34 (45.06) 28.15 (44.97)
Summer 21.52 (41.09) 22.04 (41.45)








Standard deviations in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the sample of all observations, while columns
(3) and (4) refer to the subsample composed of observations pertaining to the racial group ‘Other’. Youth refers
to the fraction of suspects aged below 25. Night refers to the fraction of stops performed between 7pm and 6am.
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probability of frisking Arabs as compared to suspects of other ethnicities. It provides a
useful lens through which to interpret the results, but does not allow us to differentiate
between statistical and taste- or bias-based discrimination.
Our model, along with the data structure and plausibly exogenous variation from the
HSAS, suggests that a statistical comparison of time trends before and after the
intervention will provide an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the change in the
HSAS level. Since the data consist of a time series, we collapse the data at the daily level
and adopt an interrupted time series design that additionally accounts for secular trends.
The simple logic of the time series experiment is analogous to a regression discontinuity
(RD) design, in that if the graph of the dependent variable shows an abrupt shift in level
or trend precisely at the point of the event, then the event is a cause of the effect on the
dependent variable.18
Given the institutional details of the HSAS, we consider the following estimating
equation to analyse the impact of the NYC-specific alert change on policing outcome Yit:
Yipt ¼b0 þ b1AIt þ b2OTHERi þ b3ðAIt OTHERiÞ þ b4ADt




þ b9TIMEt þ b10PRECINCTp þ b11ðPRECINCTp  YEARtÞ þ eipt;
ð1Þ
where AIt is an indicator variable corresponding to the period after the alert increase at
time t, ADt is an indicator variable corresponding to the period after the decrease in the
alert, and the interaction terms AIt*OTHERi and ADt*OTHERi capture additional
changes in response by police officers on those categorized as Others. Throughout, we
control for a comprehensive set of calendar time and precinct fixed effects as well as their
interaction. In our most general specifications, we also capture state dependence by
conditioning on a set of lagged dependent variables
PL
l¼1 Yi;tl, which accounts for
potential autocorrelation. The number of lags to include was selected using the most
parsimonious specification suggested by either the Akaike information criterion or the
Bayesian information criterion. The primary coefficients of interest are given by b3 and
b5, which capture the additional jumps in the probability of an outcome for Others when
compared to the comparison group from respectively increasing or decreasing the threat
level. Equation (1) also allows us to test whether the behavioural responses of police
officers offset as alert levels change in opposite directions.19
II. RESULTS
We first provide graphical evidence of how alert levels influence dimensions of policing
behaviour. We regressed each outcome variable on a linear trend, a set of month, year,
precinct, day of week and year by precinct fixed effects. We then computed the residuals
at the monthly level for those categorized as Others and the comparison group, plotted
over time in Figure 1. Intuitively, it illustrates the portion of the variation in each
outcome variable that could not have been predicted using predetermined characteristics.
We would expect the relationship between our residualized outcomes and the calendar
date to be flat, except for the potential impacts of alert level increases. Looking across the
panels in Figure 1, we first observe that the NYC alert seems to have had little impact on
policing for outcomes related to the number of stops and the arrest rate. In contrast, the
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remaining panels suggest that it was associated with disproportionate increases in the
rate of frisk and force for Others compared to the comparison group. Finally, the panels
in this figure also provide graphical evidence suggestive of the validity of the common
trends assumption necessary for the validity of our design. All four residualized policing
outcomes follow similar trends throughout the sample for the treatment and comparison
groups outside of the higher alert periods.
Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1) where the outcomes are the daily number
of stops per precinct in panel A and the probability of being frisked in panel B. The
columns differ on the basis of whether time and precinct fixed effects as well as lagged
outcomes are included, and whether heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent
standard errors calculated using the test proposed in Cumby and Huizinga (1992) are
reported. Lagged values of the dependent variable are included to account for path
dependency, which captures the idea that police behaviour may be persistent over time
depending on local conditions and not react immediately to a changing environment.
Adding these lagged values often reduces the magnitude of other estimated coefficients,
but helps to ensure that the remaining effect of alert changes is a contemporaneous
response to the information shock. Adjusted standard errors account for potential serial
correlation in the error term that may arise given the time series nature of our data.
In panel A of Table 2, we consider the daily number of stops per precinct as a proxy
for policing activity since we do not have rich data on deployment like that in Draca
et al. (2011). Across all four columns we observe that the NYC-specific alert increase
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FIGURE 1. Residualized policing outcomes in periods of orange alert level.
Notes: The series represent the monthly mean residual outcomes for Others and the comparison group. We
use residuals from a regression of the raw data on a linear trend and month, year, precinct, precinct 9 year
and day of week fixed effects.
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resources to other terrorism-prevention tasks. Further, we find that when considering
only contemporaneous variables, the interaction term between ‘Other’ and the alert
increase suggests a relative increase of around 4% in the number of stops for Others. The
magnitude of the interaction term shrinks to a statistically insignificant 1% increase once
lagged outcome values are included to capture state dependence in the number of stops.
TABLE 2
IMPACT OF THE NYC ALERT CHANGE ON THE NUMBER OF STOPS AND ON THE PROBABILITY
OF FRISK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Number of stops
Other 0.567*** 0.646*** 0.0297 0.0297
(0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025)
Alert increase 0.411*** 0.655*** 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.038) (0.039)
Alert increase9Other 0.191*** 0.163*** 0.0397 0.0397
(0.056) (0.059) (0.048) (0.049)
Alert decrease 1.061*** 0.473*** 0.109** 0.109**
(0.040) (0.055) (0.047) (0.045)
Alert decrease9Other 0.674*** 0.524*** 0.0605 0.0605
(0.054) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048)
Number of observations 415,341 415,341 415,341 415,341
p-value H0: I=D 0.000 0.000 0.257 0.259
p-value H0: I=D 0.000 0.000 0.580 0.585
Outcome mean 4.316 4.316 4.316 4.316
Panel B: Frisk
Other 2.949*** 0.963** 1.862*** 1.862***
(0.425) (0.416) (0.417) (0.465)
Alert increase 0.915* 2.962*** 2.764*** 2.764***
(0.479) (0.508) (0.506) (0.544)
Alert increase9Other 3.702*** 3.207*** 2.659*** 2.659**
(1.026) (0.984) (0.983) (1.073)
Alert decrease 3.951*** 1.255* 1.208* 1.208
(0.463) (0.698) (0.696) (0.740)
Alert decrease9Other 3.211*** 1.993** 2.192** 2.192**
(1.005) (0.971) (0.969) (1.059)
Number of observations 415,341 415,341 415,341 415,341
p-value H0: I=D 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.017
p-value H0: I=D 0.418 0.041 0.431 0.483
Outcome mean 44.925 44.925 44.925 44.925
Time and precinct
fixed effects
N Y Y Y
Dependent variable lags N N Y Y
HAC standard errors N N N Y
Notes
Robust or HAC standard errors in parentheses. The binary outcome variable Frisk is rescaled to 100 or 0.
Additional covariates include a linear trend, an interaction between the trend and the treatment group, fixed
effects for month, year, day of week, precinct and year 9 precinct. The p-values refer to tests of the differential
impact of the alert increase for Others being equal, and equal but of opposite sign to that of the decrease.
*, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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Regarding frisking in panel B of Table 2, following the NYC-specific alert, all
columns provide evidence of a statistically significant general increase as well as an
additional statistically significant increase in the probability of being frisked for those
classified as the racial group ‘Other’ relative to the comparison group.20 Based on
estimates in columns (3) and (4), all groups experienced on average a 2.76 percentage
point increase (6% increase from the mean) in the probability of being frisked, and
members of the group ‘Other’ experienced an additional 2.66 percentage point (or
additional 6%) increase. Interestingly, we also observe a statistically significant
differential decrease in being frisked for those in the group ‘Other’, which closes most of
the estimated differential in frisking once the NYC-specific threat subsides and the alert
level is decreased to yellow. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the opposite alert
changes offset each other, as indicated by the p-value in panel B of Table 2.
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (1) where the likelihood of an arrest and use of
force are the dependent variables. In panel A, we observe no statistically significant
effects on arrests in general, and no differential effect for Others. It is worth pointing out
that the hit rates test introduced by Knowles et al. (2001) is nested within our
specification, and in this case it would provide evidence of discrimination against
members of the group ‘Other’ since there is a statistically significant lower baseline arrest
rate (nearly 30% lower) for that group compared to the comparison group.
Turning to panel B of Table 3, we find that following the NYC-specific increase, there
is little change in overall use of force but a statistically significant differential increase in
the likelihood that force is used on the racial group ‘Other’ relative to the comparison
group. The magnitude for the NYC-specific alert level corresponds to an additional
increase of 9% for Others. Again, most of this differential dissipates after the alert level is
lowered, and we cannot reject that both changes offset each other.
As a whole, both the graphical and regression evidence discussed above suggest that
the NYC alert did not change the productivity of stops. We do not observe any
substantial change in arrest rates even when officers disproportionately frisk Others and
use force against them. The apparent decrease in the number of stops following the alert
increase could mean that officers were more selective about which stops to make given
their additional responsibilities, but this would in turn be expected to lead to an increase
in the arrest rate, for which there is no evidence. Rather, the evidence is consistent with
officers being no more selective but more ‘thorough’ or forceful in their stops, especially
for Others.
If we additionally make the assumption that the impact of the NYC-specific alert was
focused on Arabs, then the estimated differential impacts on this subgroup using the 2010
Census estimate for the Arab population of NYC would be of nearly 15% for frisks and
23% for force used. Thus the analysis presents robust evidence that the NYC-specific
alert increase influenced policing behaviour differentially by racial group.
To shed additional light on the disparate increase in the probability of being frisked
for Others after the NYC-specific alert, we present regression estimates by precinct and
time of day to assess whether there was systematic geographic or temporal heterogeneity
in our results.21 On the former, we carried out an analysis at the precinct level, shown in
Figure 2, which illustrates in darker shade the precincts that observed larger-than-
average disparate increases in the likelihood that Others were frisked. Figure 2 also
provides the locations of mosques in the city as a proxy for the concentration of Arab-
Muslims.22 The interpretation of this figure is a priori theoretically unclear. On the one
hand, we may expect larger impacts in precincts where the Arab population is lower since
police officers may be more likely to have unconscious biases against people with whom
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they interact less. On the other hand, we may expect that the impact would be larger
where more Muslims live and congregate, and in precincts with more high-value targets.
The former appears to be what is shown in Figure 2 since the impact on frisk appears to
be primarily driven by areas with higher concentrations of mosques and in high-priority
areas like lower- or mid-Manhattan. To shed further light on how the presence of
TABLE 3
IMPACT OF THE NYC ALERT CHANGE ON THE NUMBER OF STOPS AND ON THE PROBABILITY
OF ARREST AND FORCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Arrest
Other 2.696*** 1.997*** 1.913*** 1.913***
(0.206) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210)
Alert increase 1.433*** 0.252 0.252 0.252
(0.248) (0.270) (0.270) (0.271)
Alert increase9Other 0.472 0.456 0.422 0.422
(0.460) (0.459) (0.459) (0.457)
Alert decrease 1.559*** 0.189 0.179 0.179
(0.235) (0.363) (0.363) (0.364)
Alert decrease9Other 0.481 0.324 0.319 0.319
(0.442) (0.446) (0.446) (0.443)
Number of observations 415,341 415,341 415,341 415,341
p-value H0: I=D 0.991 0.878 0.904 0.9037
p-value H0: I=D 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.0085
Outcome mean 6.680 6.680 6.680 6.680
Panel B: Force
Other 0.776** 0.893** 0.113 0.113
(0.390) (0.390) (0.390) (0.445)
Alert increase 2.912*** 0.018 0.108 0.108
(0.427) (0.457) (0.456) (0.470)
Alert increase9Other 2.503*** 2.495*** 2.088** 2.088**
(0.919) (0.901) (0.899) (0.961)
Alert decrease 3.746*** 0.411 0.287 0.287
(0.406) (0.633) (0.631) (0.654)
Alert decrease9Other 1.608* 1.469* 1.496* 1.496
(0.890) (0.877) (0.875) (0.924)
Number of observations 415,341 415,341 415,341 415,341
p-value H0: I=D 0.017 0.020 0.034 0.046
p-value H0: I=D 0.093 0.053 0.264 0.304
Outcome mean 23.013 23.013 23.013 23.013
Time and precinct
fixed effects
N Y Y Y
Dependent variable lags N N Y Y
HAC standard errors N N N Y
Notes
Robust or HAC standard errors in parentheses. The binary outcome variables Arrest and Force are rescaled to
100 or 0. Additional covariates include a linear trend, an interaction between the trend and the treatment group,
fixed effects for month, year, day of week, precinct and year 9 precinct. The p-values refer to tests of the
differential impact of the alert increase for Others being equal, and equal but of opposite sign to that of the
decrease.
*, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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mosques influences frisking by precinct, we expanded equation (1) to allow for
differential responses by the number of mosques in the precinct. The results are shown in
Subsection 1.1 of the Online Appendix, and confirm that differential increases in frisking
for Others were larger in precincts with more mosques.
Turning to temporal heterogeneity, Subsection 1.2 of the Online Appendix provides
evidence that the increases in frisking occurred primarily during rush-hour (5am–10am,
5pm–7pm) and late in the evening (11pm–4am). The rush hour periods represent times
where the risk of terrorism threat is greater and potentially deadlier, while activity late at
night is more likely to appear suspicious to law enforcement.
Robustness of the main findings
To complement and explore the robustness of both the graphical evidence in
Figure 1 and results in Tables 2 and 3, we considered a more general method to
Other precincts
Precincts with larger increase in frisking
Mosques
FIGURE 2. Impact of the NYC alert change on the probability of frisk, by precinct. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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explore whether alert levels influenced policing. Specifically, we estimated a restricted
version of equation (1) that does not include indicators for alert changes or their
interactions with other covariates. In their place, we ran the model repeatedly with a
single indicator for each two-week or one-month interval in the sample, along with
an interaction of this indicator with the racial category ‘Other’. This exercise has
many uses; it allows us to observe the timing of any jump and see whether it
corresponds to an actual alert level change, further examines pre-alert trends,
investigates the length of policing responses, and conducts a placebo test over the
entire sample.
Figure 3 provides the results from this exercise at the two-week level where each data
point presents the estimate for that specific two-week window.23 Notice that there is a
sustained spike in the frisk differential around the NYC-specific threat. Statistically
significant estimates are denoted by numbers above each panel. In total, only four (two)
two-week periods are estimated to have had a statistically significant impact on the frisk
(force) differential for the entire sample period, including one during the NYC-specific
threat.24 For both outcomes, the increase associated with the alert increase of interest
also appears to be much more sustained.
We also considered an RD design relaxing the continuity requirements of the
running variable (time) and extrapolating from the discretization around the cut-off
given by the dates of alert increases. From a conceptual standpoint, both an
interrupted time series analysis and RD are similar in the region of interest as they
approximate the conditional expectation on both sides of the cut-off. A graphical
analysis as well as the corresponding estimates for the NYC-specific alert are
presented in Subsection 1.4 of the Online Appendix.25 We do not focus on the RD
approach given the time series nature of our data, but it serves as a robustness
exercise that does not rely on a comparison group for validity. The RD design yields
similar conclusions to our main specification for arrests and frisks. For the likelihood
of frisk, the estimates for the group ‘Other’ are positive, large in magnitude (around
13%) and statistically significant, while those for the comparison group are small and
statistically insignificant. For arrests, there was little change for either group as the
estimates are small and statistically insignificant. For the outcomes of force used and
the number of stops, the impacts are also estimated to be small and statistically non-
significant for both groups. This contrasts with our main specification, which finds a
decrease in overall stops as well as an increase of force used on Others.
We conducted three additional robustness checks. First, we estimated equation (1) at
the hourly level with hour of day fixed effects rather than at the day level as shown in
Subsection 1.5 of the Online Appendix. We prefer the daily specification given the
uncertainty about which time of day the different alerts were announced, but the main
results are similar. Second, in Subsection 1.6 of the Online Appendix, we present results
from equation (1) where we condition the outcomes on the number of stops. That is, we
calculate the daily number of frisks, arrests and events involving force per stop to partial
out the effects of the change in stops from the effects of other police behaviour. Our main
findings are robust to this empirical strategy. Third, we conducted the analysis using only
African-Americans as the comparison group in Subsection 1.7 of the Online Appendix,
and the main results are quantitatively similar except for the estimated differential change
in the probability of force used for Others, which is smaller and becomes statistically
insignificant.
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FIGURE 3. Bi-weekly estimates of the impact of changes in the HSAS alert level on policing outcomes.
Notes: Numbers above panels denote statistical significance at the 5% level. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Interpretation of the main results
Following the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was much discussion of
threats from terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, and the HSAS level was often
referred to as the ‘terror alert level’. Intuitively, the HSAS can be seen as introducing a
signal into the policing environment that could influence both police officers and citizens
since it affects the tasks and focus of the police force, which may in turn lead to strategic
responses from criminals. Additional efforts by police officers in specific areas could deter
criminals or have them change the location of their crime.26 This is less likely to arise in
the case of terrorism since it may be unlikely that potential terrorists will either be
deterred by the threat of apprehension or change their target after months of planning.
As such, unlike for common crimes, allocating more police officers alone is unlikely to
prevent terrorism unless it is accompanied by active measures such as frisking. New
information regarding the source of threats may in turn lead police officers to revise their
beliefs about the likelihood that individuals from different backgrounds will yield a
successful stop for a given type of crime. If police officers associated Al Qaeda threats
with Arabs or Muslims, then they may naturally have targeted them more after the alert
increase, either consciously or subconsciously.
This stresses that one should be cautious when interpreting our main results since
changes in policing by ethnic group or race may not represent racial prejudice. These
policing responses indicate increased targeting or profiling of a certain group, but result
from information regarding an increased likelihood of a threat with an associated
increase in the stakes regarding the success of stops.
A model encompassing these considerations and motivating our empirical analysis is
presented in the Appendix. The model modifies the hit rates test by focusing on the
impact of an exogenous information shock on policing behaviour, rather than looking at
static outcome differentials. It incorporates the additional duties of law enforcement
officials related to terrorism, and allows officers to update their beliefs about the
likelihood that Arabs may engage in terrorist acts during periods of high alert levels. The
model generates the following key predictions: periods of high alerts should be associated
with disproportionate increases in frisking, the relative quantity of stops (holding
resources allocated to the Stop-and-Frisk programme constant), and potentially the use
of force for Arabs or Muslims if officers believe them to be relatively more likely to
engage in terrorist acts. This is consistent with our empirical findings apart from that
regarding the number of stops, which could be explained by manpower re-allocations
and task changes in response to the threat.
While our model and related tests cannot distinguish between statistical and
taste- or bias-based discrimination, using intuition similar to Abaluck et al. (2016)
provides additional insight. Our results indicate that following the alert level
increase, police officers frisked and used force against relatively more members of
the group ‘Other’ without an increase in the arrest rate. This suggests that the
return to additional frisks was low, consistent with a non-rational behavioural
reaction. Nevertheless, this is again complicated by the fact that police officer stops
may not have a deterrent effect on potential terrorists as in the standard hit rates
test. Successful stops or arrests regarding terrorism are also rare events with very
high payoffs to law enforcement such that even veteran officers may not have
much experience in this context. They may in turn less accurately assess potential
risks, resorting to biases and broader profiling of specific groups as a result. Thus
an explanation for our findings is that limited cognitive capacity could have led to
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profiling given the strong associations between the Middle East, 9/11 and other
terrorist threats during that period, as well as evidence from Lichtbau and Drew
(2004) suggesting that changes in the HSAS may place undue stress on
police officers, particularly when the threat is more salient.27 Since stress has also
been shown to influence decision-making,28 the judgment of officers may have
changed following terrorist threats, and less attention was paid to being unbiased
and fair.
Our results thus appear particularly consistent with a broad attempt at statistical
discrimination influenced by group stereotypes, although we cannot reject that terrorist
threats led to increased taste for discrimination against Arabs or Muslims. Similarly,
while the response appears unwarranted due to the lack of successful stops, we cannot
rule out that additional frisking was efficient given that terrorists may not otherwise be
deterred. The interpretation of our results thus hinges on a careful consideration of the
daily duties of police officers regarding both terrorism and common crimes, and of
differences in behaviour between the two types of criminals. In times of a terrorist threat,
the responsibilities of police officers partly shift away from minimizing crime towards
prevention and protection.
III. CONCLUSION
It is well established that the duties of police officers in cities like New York
changed greatly after 11 September 2001, due to increased terrorism concerns. On 1
August 2004, a specific terrorist threat led the US Department of Homeland Security
to warn the country that Al Qaeda had apparently studied financial institutions in
three cities, including New York, and were possibly planning an imminent attack.
This warning led to an increase in the terror alert level from yellow to orange
associated with additional security measures taken by the NYPD. The news of this
terrorist threat also plausibly provided salient information to law enforcement about
changes in the risk of an attack, potentially affecting the day-to-day decisions of
individual officers.
In this paper, we examine if this change in the HSAS level led to differential changes
in policing as part of the Stop-and-Frisk programme for suspects classified as ‘Other’
racial group by the NYPD, including Arabs. Our empirical results provide robust
evidence that the higher alert level led to a disproportionate increase in the likelihood of
being frisked or having force used against them for this group. Yet there was no
corresponding increase in arrests or the likelihood of being stopped. These outcome
differentials in turn reverted back to normal after the alert was lowered to yellow.
Racial profiling and police accountability have been at the centre of important
ongoing public debates. Policing is an area where biases may be particularly likely to
emerge, either consciously or unconsciously, in response to changing information about
potential threats from organizations commonly associated with certain ethnic groups.
Bias may be unconscious and discrimination latent, but the consequences in New York
City for Arab citizens are very real, as illustrated by disproportionate increases in frisking
and force used in periods when the alert level was heightened. One interpretation of our
findings is that latent discrimination emerged when alert levels were more salient to police
officers. This is consistent with racial profiling that did not lead to additional productive
stops, as proxied by arrest rates. Nevertheless, we cannot isolate the source of
discrimination or rule out that this policing response to the higher alert level was efficient.
This is due to both deterrence considerations and the important distinction between
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traditional criminal activity and preventing terrorist attacks, as shown in the theoretical
model.
These considerations also provide a potential rationale for the low test–retest
reliability and predictive validity of psychological tests designed to measure implicit bias
if both evolving social context and current events affect views of groups such as Arabs.29
Negative views that individual officers hold about a group are more likely to emerge and
affect their decision-making following salient events associated with the group.30 In
summary, our analysis suggests that to inform debates on racial profiling and police
accountability, future work is needed to develop more general tests of discrimination in
settings that consider the full set of duties faced by police officers that go well beyond
traditional crime minimization.
APPENDIX: ECONOMICMODEL
The Knowles et al. (2001) hit rates test remains the major avenue through which researchers
examine police racial bias. This test was developed in the context of motor vehicle searches and is
based on a simple model where police officers decide which vehicles to subject to searches and
motorists decide whether to break the law by carrying drugs or illegal weapons. Motorists are
assumed to have ex ante taken into account the probability of being searched and the penalty if
they are caught. Racial bias is introduced as a preference parameter that reduces the perceived cost
of searching vehicles of minority groups. This framework stipulates that in the absence of racial
bias, each officer would pursue a monitoring strategy that maximizes the number of successful
search outcomes given a cost of search, where a successful search is defined as one that uncovers
some contraband.
Our model has several parallels, but is adapted to consider that individual officers must allocate
their efforts to conducting stops s relating to either potential terrorist threats t or other criminal
activity o. To ease exposition, pedestrians are considered to be in one of two racial groups: Arabs
(A) and an aggregated group comprised of all other races (G). The key element of the model for our
empirical analyses relates to the possibility of there being two terrorism threat levels l: baseline b
and high h. By exploiting changes in terror alert levels as exogenous information shocks, we are
able to overcome standard issues of conditioning on ex post information when performing a hit
rates test on frisking suspects of different races. We next describe the behaviour of each actor in the
model, the characteristics of an equilibrium, and theoretical predictions from a change in the HSAS
level on policing outcomes, in turn.
Criminals
Individuals can be either type of criminal (t or o), and police officers correctly identify their type.
We use r 2 {A,G} to denote the race of the individual, and c 2 {1,. . .,C} to represent other
characteristics that are observed by the police (but potentially unobserved by the econometrician)
at zero cost and assumed to be independent of threat levels. The number of individuals in group (r,
c) is expressed by Nr,c. An individual of type o receives a benefit vo from committing a crime, and
faces a cost ho if subsequently stopped by the police.
31 Since criminals may be aware of potential
changes in policing activities in response to changes in the likelihood of a terrorist attack, we allow
the expected number of daily stops made to target group (r,c) to depend on the terrorism alert level
(l), and define this value as rl.
An individual who engages in criminal activity of type o has an expected payoff of




and commits a crime if ur,c,o(vo,ho,rl)≥0. Defining Fr,c(vo,ho) to represent the group-specific joint
conditional distribution of vo and ho, the crime o rate for group (r,c) denoted by K
r;c
o ðrlÞ is given by
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 0Þ ¼ Kr;co ðvo; ho; rlÞ;
Kr;co ðrlÞ 
Z
Kr;co ðvo; ho; rlÞ dFr;cðvo; hoÞ:
Similarly, an individual of type t faces benefits and costs respectively denoted by vt and ht. We
define Mr,c(vt,ht) as the joint conditional distribution of vt and ht. We assume that criminals of type
t have a simplified payoff function of the form
ur;c;tðvt; ht; rÞ ¼ vt  ht;
since they are assumed to not attach any weight to the likelihood of being stopped or arrested. In
other words, this assumption implies that potential terrorists, unlike other criminals, cannot be
deterred by the threat of judicial sanctions.32 Thus a terrorist activity will be undertaken if and only
if vtht≥0, the probability of which is given byM(vtht). We do not require this assumption for our
empirical tests to be valid, but it influences the interpretation. Rather, we aim to show that the
model can be extended to motivate empirical tests even in the case where terrorists cannot be
deterred. If terrorists behave as common criminals do, then the standard hit rates test applies and
we can interpret outcome differentials accordingly.
Police officers
Assume that there is a mass P of police officers who, after having exogenously been assigned to a
given precinct, draw a type p from a uniform distribution on [0,1].33 Given each officer’s search
capacity Sp, the total number of stops is given by
Sðr; c; s; lÞ ¼ P
Z 1
0
Spðr; c; s; lÞ dp:
Since each officer allocates their efforts between both types of crimes, the following condition must
be satisfied:
Sopðr; c; lÞ þ Stpðr; c; lÞ ¼ Spðr; c; s; lÞ ¼ Sp:
Under the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk programme, each police officer first chooses whether or not to
stop a suspect and then decides whether to additionally frisk that suspect. We define yrp;s;l as the
benefit that an officer receives from a successful stop (arrest). Officers are assumed to face a cost d
to stop a suspect, and an additional cost q to frisk the suspect. For stops related to crimes o we
define
Woðr; c; lÞ ¼ PðGuilty of crime ojr; c; lÞ ¼ Kr;co ðSpðr; c; o; lÞÞ;
and for stops related to crimes t we define34
Wtðr; c; lÞ ¼ PðGuilty of crime tjr; c; lÞ ¼ Fr;cðM; lÞ;
where Wt is the subjective probability that an officer assigns to an individual being guilty of a
terrorism crime, and Fr:[0,1]9{b,h}?[0,1] is a distortion function that can vary by racial group and
depends on the true probability of guilt and on the alert level. In general, we would expect that
yrp;t;l [ y
r
p;o;l and Wt<Wo, since (i) the benefits of stopping a terrorist attack likely outweigh those
from arresting a suspect for a common crime, and (ii) the crime rate for terror activities is lower
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than that for other crimes. To understand police officer behaviour in equilibrium, we use
backwards induction and solve a two-stage decision process, outlined below.35
Second-stage equilibrium Conditional on having made a stop, a police officer decides whether
or not to frisk the suspect. Presumably, the decision to frisk the suspect relies on a different
information set than that available when stopping the suspect, since the officer is likely to have
gathered additional information during the stop. Denote by g the unobserved (to the
econometrician) additional signal of guilt. The officer, conditional onWs,
36 optimizes
p2 ¼ maxf0;HðWs; g; yrp;s;lÞ  qg;
whereH is a function representing the benefits of frisking, which is increasing inWs, g and yrp;s;l.
The optimal choice is given by
1 if HðWs; g; yrp;s;lÞ  q 0;
0 otherwise:

Intuitively, the officer chooses to frisk a suspect if the value of the additional information that they
gain during the stop exceeds the cost of undertaking the frisk.37
Further discussion regarding g is warranted. It is well recognized in the traditional hit rates
model that g precludes the use of standard regression analysis since a disparity in the rate of frisk
cannot be interpreted as evidence of profiling or discrimination given that the decision to frisk relies
on unobserved private information acquired by the officer during the stop. By imposing an
additional assumption on g, we can overcome this limitation since our focus is on not the disparity
in the rate of frisk but rather the additional difference in the disparity in the rate of frisk caused by
an exogenous information change. Changes in the terror alert level are uncorrelated with g.
Therefore our tests require that g is stable across sudden changes in the terrorism threat level such
that the quality of the unobserved information acquired by police officers during stops is the same
whether the HSAS level is yellow or orange, ruling out the possibility that the difference in frisking
hinges on g.
First-stage equilibrium In the first stage, the officer decides whether or not to stop a suspect
taking into account both the costs and expected benefits if they subsequently frisk the suspect. The
officer simultaneously allocates their total number of stops between the two types of crimes.38










SspfWsyrp;s;l  dþ E½p2g:
Ignoring capacity constraints, an officer will stop an individual of group (r,c) for a crime of
type s in a period of alert level l if
Wsðr; c; lÞyrp;s;l  dþ E½p2[ 0:
Without imposing additional restrictions, this model cannot provide a prediction on the
fraction of stops that are allocated to each type of crime or racial group.39 However, under some
mild additional assumptions, we can expect an interior solution in which individuals are stopped
for both types of crime. First, consider a scenario where police officers allocate their entire effort to
terrorism crimes.40 In this case, criminals of type o would rationally expect rl=0, and they would
not be searched in equilibrium. This would naturally lead to Wo(r,c,l)=1, and it would therefore be
optimal for an officer to start stopping suspects for other crimes provided that the payoff from a
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guaranteed arrest outweighs the cost of stopping the suspect plus the foregone expected benefit of
stopping an additional terrorist.
While this remains an assumption, we believe that it is fairly innocuous and evidently satisfied
in the data. It states that even in periods associated with high terrorist threats, police officers would
continue focusing on their full slate of duties and not devote their entire attention to preventing
terrorism. However, officers may change the emphasis that they place on each of their duties as the
risk of a terrorist attack changes. Conversely, a parallel assumption is needed to guarantee that
police officers do not completely ignore terrorism threats, no matter the terror alert level. This
assumption is also fairly mild and consistent with NYPD protocols as described in Section I.
Predicted effects from an exogenous change in the alert level
Having described the general model, we use it to study the impact of changes in the terrorism alert
level on policing, and derive testable implications. We assume the following:
Fr;cðM; hÞFr;cðM; lÞ;ðaÞ
FA;cðM; hÞFG;cðM; hÞ;ðbÞ
FA;cðM; lÞ ¼ FG;cðM; lÞ;ðcÞ
yrp;t;h  yrp;t;l and yAp;t;h  yGp;t;h:ðdÞ
Condition (a) suggests that officers believe a terrorist attack to be more likely during periods of
elevated threat, and condition (b) suggests that officers may update their beliefs and consider Arabs
relatively more likely to engage in terrorist acts during periods of high alert levels. Condition (c) is a
simplifying assumption that rules out baseline discrimination to focus on the impacts of alert
levels.41 Condition (d) suggests that any payoff to thwarting a terrorist attack may be higher during
periods of increased threat, even though stopping a terrorist attack from any group may yield an
identical benefit. In the previous subsection, we implicitly assumed that the payoff and cost of
successfully carrying out a terrorist attack (i.e. G(vtht)) did not change with the alert level, such
that changes in alert levels simply reflect changes in the information set of law enforcement officers.
The difference in the likelihood of carrying out a frisk between a period of high alert and a
period of baseline alert level is
H

Fr;cðM; hÞ; g; yrp;s;h
HFr;cðM; lÞ; g; yrp;s;l;
and given the previous assumptions,
H

FA;cðM; hÞ; g; yAp;s;h
HFA;cðM; lÞ; g; yAp;s;l
HFG;cðM; hÞ; g; yGp;s;hHFG;cðM; lÞ; g; yGp;s;l:
Our model thus predicts that following an increase in the alert level, Arabs would be frisked more
in equilibrium, and that this increase is larger than for other racial groups. A racial differential in
the probability of frisking a suspect in this setting can be explained either by an asymmetric
increase in the benefits of preventing an attack from Arabs or from changes in beliefs about guilt. If
we rule out changes in beliefs, then potential bias is introduced only through the payoff modifier as
in the standard hit rates test, and a difference in frisking could be interpreted as taste-based
discrimination. In the presence of both channels, we cannot distinguish between taste-based and
statistical discrimination based on correct or incorrect beliefs.
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Nevertheless, we can assess whether these additional frisks were productive, reflecting true
changes in the probability of terrorism crimes. Statistical discrimination implies that officers use
race as a proxy for the likelihood of committing a certain crime, and conduct stops based on
productivity. Therefore an increase in the probability of frisking should be accompanied by an
increase in the arrest rate. Otherwise, if police officers frisk more suspects but make no more
arrests, then this suggests a low return on the additional frisks performed and thus makes an
explanation based on stereotypes, biases or taste more likely.
Now consider the impact of an alert level increase on the first stage. The model has an
unambiguous prediction on the direction of expected changes in the allocation of stops. An increase
in alert level under the previous assumptions increases the value of stops related to terrorism.
Therefore we would expect a relative increase in the share of stops that are related to terrorism. The
model does not provide a closed-form solution for the allocation of stops, and we cannot identify
terrorism-related stops (or any reason for the stop or type of crime suspected), but we may expect
this to be reflected by an increase in the number of stops of Arabs. In the presence of decreasing
returns to stopping members of a given group, the differential impact of alert levels on Arabs may
be smaller, but the same logic and conclusions apply. Since terrorism stops are relatively more
important in periods of high alert, more Arabs will be stopped if police officers are more likely to
associate that group with the terrorist threats. Since we assume that g is constant before and after
alert changes, this would also translate into a higher probability of frisk.
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NOTES
1. A complete list of foiled attempts since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is provided at https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List_of_unsuccessful_terrorist_plots_in_the_United_States_post-9/11 (accessed 16 November 2019).
2. For example, see Tankebe (2013), Mazerolle et al. (2013) and Schuck et al. (2008) as well as surveys of the
literature on perceptions of the police. While much research focuses on black and white differences, Sun and
Wu (2015) survey Arab Americans and find that the majority have a great deal or a lot of confidence in the
local police. They also find no statistically significant difference in confidence between Muslims, who
accounted for 40% of their sample, and those of other religious affiliations.
3. See Fang and Moro (2011) for a recent survey of the literature on statistical discrimination. Within this
literature, perceptions of identity are defined as stereotypes that relate to situations where a police officer
observes the group identity of the suspect and assigns them a perceived value from a latent index of
criminality based on these stereotypes.
4. Consistent with this hypothesis, Jobard et al. (2012) find that Arab passengers were more than seven times
likelier to be stopped and searched on the Paris metro than Whites, and cases of racially discriminatory
police stops in France and Spain have recently been brought to the European Court of Human Rights
(Seydi and others v. France, Muhammed v. Spain).
5. Legewie (2013) suggests that terrorist attacks can have a profound short-term effect on individual
perceptions, while Legewie (2016) argues that local events related to police shootings can influence police
behaviour related to force.
6. During high-alert times, there is a change in how officers are deployed, and additional patrols are allocated
to high-profile locations across cities. This change in deployment is well documented in the popular press
and used for identification in both Klick and Tabarrok (2005) and Draca et al. (2011).
7. See also Fischhoff (2002) regarding the vagueness of the HSAS more generally.
8. See, for example, New York Civil Liberties Union, Stop-and-Frisk Data, at www.nyclu.org/content/stop-
and-frisk-data (accessed 13 November 2019).
9. Shi (2009) provides compelling evidence that officers reduce policing intensity when faced with greater
expected penalties by exploiting events surrounding the April 2001 riot in Cincinnati.
10. Threats are first transmitted through governmental channels to federal agencies and other government
bodies before being transmitted to governors, state authorities, major law enforcement agencies and
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mayors. They are then shared with selected private sector entities before being publicly announced through
a press conference.
11. See Eggen et al. (2004), Aguirre (2004), Jehl and Johnston (2004) and Taylor (2005) for details regarding the
1 August 2004 threat discussed here.
12. The dates of other alert changes are provided in the Online Appendix, along with an analysis of their effects
on policing outcomes.
13. The media later reported that there may also have been ‘test runs’ in days prior to the alert increase,
although this information was never corroborated by the Department of Homeland Security.
14. Social psychologists also provide evidence that modern-day bias among law enforcement personnel is most
likely to be in the form of implicit bias, while Harcourt (2007) makes it clear that we have no evidence or
theory to suggest whether racial profiling may be an effective counter-terrorism measure or instead be
completely inadequate.
15. Force is defined by the NYPD as a stop that involves one or more of the following: physically manhandling
the suspect with hands, physically having to put the suspect on the ground or against a wall, drawing and/or
pointing their service weapon, using a baton, handcuffs or pepper spray, or other scenarios that involve a
specific physical threat or action against the suspect. Approximately 35% of stops involving force did not
lead to frisking.
16. We do not include African-Americans in the primary analysis since they constitute a large fraction of
practising Muslims in the USA and may therefore be inappropriate as a comparison group. See, for
example, Bagby (2012). The main results are robust if we include African-Americans in the comparison
group, and Subsection 1.7 of the Online Appendix presents results contrasting Others to African-Americans
directly.
17. In the sample, 35% of all stops were not stops that officers had to report by law, hinting at some possible
incentive scheme in which police officers want to convey that they are making efforts. The sample cannot be
restricted only to stops that have to be reported due to conditioning on ex post information. The external
validity of the results relies on the sample being representative of all stops in the city, an assumption that is
untestable with our data but seems plausible given the high percentage of stops that did not have to be
reported. In addition, we may worry that police officers specifically underreport racially sensitive stops to
avoid outside criticism, or overreport them to signal efforts in preventing terrorism, making the net effect on
reporting ambiguous.
18. The major distinction is that time series data are discretized and generally not independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), whereas RDs conceptually require that the assignment variable be continuous with no
selective heaping on either side of the discontinuity.
19. While the increases received greater media attention and results concerning alert decreases may yield less
clear results if there are lags between the end of a threat and the lowering of the HSAS level, decreases are
important to consider if alerts impacted day-to-day NYPD activities and led to additional tasks and
measures.
20. General disparities in the probability of being frisked should not be interpreted as evidence of racial
profiling. The decision to frisk after having stopped a suspect relies on private information obtained by the
officer before and during the stop. Persico and Todd (2008) stress that the hit rates test cannot be performed
in this case and that this alone does not constitute evidence of profiling. This problem does not apply when
considering whether the alert level changes may create profiling because the change in the probability of
being frisked is caused by an exogenous information shock.
21. Geographical coordinates of stops are not available in the data until 2006, preventing more precise
heterogeneity analyses around the NYC alert increase.
22. The list of mosques was obtained from http://hirr.hartsem.edu/mosque/database.html (accessed 14
November 2019).
23. Performing the analysis at the monthly level leads to similar conclusions, as shown in Subsection 1.3 of the
Online Appendix.
24. There is suggestive evidence that some of the placebo periods associated with a higher frisk differential were
linked to other terrorist plots such as the arrest in November 2003 of a terrorist suspected to have links with
another terrorist who plotted an attack on the Brooklyn Bridge, and the arrest in December 2005 of a man
suspected of plotting an attack on oil and natural gas targets in NYC and New Jersey.
25. We follow the bias-corrected estimation procedure with robust inference in Calonico et al. (2014) with
MSE-optimal bandwidth selection when undertaking this analysis.
26. We may expect this to be particularly true for traditional criminals from racial groups perceived as likely to
be targeted by the NYPD as part of counter-terrorism measures. This would go in the opposite direction of
what we find and lead to relative decreases in stops, frisks and uses of force for those groups.
27. Dowling et al. (2006) present evidence that the events of 9/11 led to the manifestation of psychological
issues in NYPD officers.
28. See Starcke and Brand (2012) or Morgado et al. (2015) for recent interdisciplinary reviews of this literature.
29. Psychologists have designed tests to detect an individual’s ability to engage in discriminatory behaviour by
either considering differences in subject response times (Correll et al. 2007) to images or tracking a
physiological response such as one’s heart rate.
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30. In addition, our results also point to the importance of changing contexts to detect potentially latent
discrimination, an issue that deserves further study not only for policing behaviour but also in
considerations of algorithmic fairness, since decisions are increasingly made by automated statistical or
machine-learning predictive models.
31. This modelling for crime type o has a one-to-one correspondence to the hit rates model of Knowles et al.
(2001), to ease comparisons.
32. This does not mean that would-be terrorists are non-responsive to any police measure, but we assume that
they will not abandon their plan of committing an attack due to the likelihood of being caught or the threat
of being sanctioned.
33. We abstract from precinct assignment considerations in our setting by assuming that it is exogenous of
terrorism considerations and unaffected by changes in the terrorism threat level.
34. Police officers’ main tasks and formation primarily relate to non-terrorist crimes for which they likely have
better information. Terrorism crimes are such that it would be difficult to credibly estimate a rate of crime
by ethnic group, and may thus be more likely to be affected by stereotypes. It also seems that threats of
attacks may more likely affect perceptions of guilt of certain minorities than give police officers additional
utility from stopping those minorities. Having discrimination enter as in the usual hit rates test would
ignore the possibility that alert levels hold salient information about the threat of terrorism from the Middle
East, whether founded or not. This explicitly highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between statistical
and taste-based discrimination in this setting.
35. We suppress the more straightforward arguments of functions in the following subsubsections for ease of
notation.
36. At the time of the decision, the officer has already formed his beliefs regarding the probability of a suspect’s
guilt given (r,c), thereforeWs is not a random variable but rather the realization of one.
37. This value could be negative if the officer believes that the suspect is less likely to be guilty after having
performed the stop, or have a value near 0 if the officer either did not gain valuable information or is
already highly confident of the suspect’s guilt. In each of these cases, the suspect would not be frisked.
38. Realistically, we may expect the marginal benefit of stopping a given group for a specific type of crime to
decrease with the amount of stops if police officers first target the most ‘suspicious’ individuals. We abstract
from this possibility in the main model for simplicity, but discuss the implications of allowing this feature
below.
39. In other words, there is no closed-form solution for the allocation of stops.
40. This could occur if the (presumably) much higher benefit of a successful terrorism-related arrest outweighs
the (presumably) much lower probability of arresting a terrorist.
41. This assumption is not necessary for our empirical tests to be valid, but simplifies the exposition.
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